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Abstract 
Capital cities are government cities that tend to lack a competitive political economy. Especially 
secondary capital cities – defined as capitals that are not the primary economic centers of their 
nation states – are pressured to increase their economic competitiveness in today’s globalized 
interurban competition by formulating locational policies. This article compares the locational 
policies agendas of Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, and Washington, D.C. The comparison reveals 
that (1) secondary capital cities tend to formulate development-oriented locational policies 
agendas, (2) local tax autonomy best explains the variance in locational policies agendas, and 
(3) secondary capital cities possess urban governance arrangements where public actors 
dominate and where developers are the only relevant private actors. The challenge for 
secondary capital cities is to formulate locational policies that enable them to position 
themselves as government cities, as well as business cities, while not solely relying on the 
development of their physical infrastructure. 
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Introduction 
Economic globalization contests the political and symbolic centrality of capital cities. The 
ascendance of global cities, the rise of transnational institutions, and the increasing 
concentration of the knowledge economy in a few dominant metropolitan centers challenge the 
traditionally importance of capital cities (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991). Contemporary 
capitalism pressures capital cities to enter into globalized interurban competition like any other 
city. It is, however, uncertain whether and how cities can influence their economic destiny in 
an international market economy (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Secondary capital cities (SCCs), 
defined as capitals that are not the primary economic centers of their nation states, are especially 
challenged by these pressures because these cities lack a competitive political economy 
(Kaufmann 2018). 
The political economy of SCCs differs from political economies of other types of cities because 
SCCs have more complicated government-market interactions, and they are subject to a greater 
influence from the national government on the local economy, the local labor market, and local 
land markets (Campbell 2000). The specific political economy of SCCs is produced by 
“complex relationships between government, private-sector, and third-sector actors [that] form 
a distinctive economic system, which is spatially manifested through their interactions, which, 
in turn, produce information and knowledge” (Mayer et al. 2018, p. 4). As a consequence, the 
regional economy of SCCs possesses strong clusters of firms in highly regulated and 
knowledge-intensive sectors, it lacks strong industrial sectors and it is depend on public 
procurement (Kaufmann 2018; Mayer et al. 2018). And finally, capital cities are places that 
represent national identity, where a nation’s memory and symbols are staged and thus they have 
to maintain a modern and representative infrastructure (Cochrane 2006). The legacy as 
‘government cities’ constitutes the unique competitiveness challenges for SCCs. Therefore, 
SCCs enter globalized interurban competition with a political economy that is configured 
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differently than the political economies of global economic powerhouses, such as New York, 
London, or Tokyo, or overachievers in contemporary capitalism, such as the Silicon Valley, 
Amsterdam, or Singapore. It is within these settings that SCCs seek ways to position themselves 
in interurban competition, and they do this by formulating locational policies that aim to 
increase their economic competitiveness (Kaufmann 2018).  
Nation states deliberately chose secondary cities as capitals in order to exert a balance between 
different regions or cities within a nation state with the idea that they should refrain from 
developing into economic powerhouses. In some instances, SCCs were chosen to avoid the 
concentration of economic and political powers and to serve as independent and alternative 
sites to traditional commercial centers (Gottmann 1977; Mayer et al. 2016; Slack and 
Chattopadhyay 2009). In other cases, formerly colonized nations sought to break with their 
colonial ties by building a new capital city as a symbol of their independence (Moser 2010; 
Rossmann 2017). SCCs can be found on every continent. Famous examples of SCCs exist in 
Africa (e.g. Pretoria, Abuja), Asia (e.g. Jerusalem, Islamabad), Oceania (e.g. Wellington, 
Canberra), Europe (e.g. Berlin, The Hague), North America (e.g. Washington, D.C., Ottawa) 
and South America (e.g. Brasilia, Sucre). National governments may choose to establish new 
capital cities from scratch or to relocate capital cities to secondary cities. Examples include the 
relocation of the Brazilian capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1960, the relocation of the 
Nigerian capital from Lagos to Abuja in 1991, and the construction of the new Malaysian 
administrative capital of Putrajaya, which began in 1995. Relocating a capital city is a normal 
process in the political life of empires, kingdoms, and nations with regard to time and space: 
around 40 % of all nation states have discussed relocating their capital city (Rossmann 2017). 
Given that the global system of capital cities is dynamic, it is likely that other SCCs will be 
established in the future and that these new SCCs will face the same competitiveness challenge 
that current SCCs do.  
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The political science and public administration literature perceive SCCs as government cities 
and it analyzes them in relation to the (federal) nation state (e.g. Harris 1995; Rowat 1968, 
1973) or it focuses on how capital cities in federations are organized and financed (Slack and 
Chattopadhyay 2009). This article perceives SCCs as economic actors that engage in globalized 
interurban competition and thus it uncouples SCCs, to a certain degree, from the analytical 
fixation on the nation-state.  
In what follows, I draw on the literature on multilevel governance, local autonomy, urban 
politics, and locational policies in order to establish the theoretical framework for this article. 
In individual case studies, I study variations in the locational policies agendas of four different 
SCCs, namely Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, and Washington, D.C. The cross-case comparison 
finds that SCCs tend to formulate locational policies agendas that favor the physical 
development of their cities. It also reveals that local tax autonomy greatly influences the 
formulation of locational policies because it alters the opportunity structure through which local 
governments raise funds. I discuss the generalizability of these findings and I conclude by 
briefly recommending strategies that may counteract the negative implications of SCCs’ 
locational policies agendas. 
A Multilevel Governance Framework for Studying Urban Policies 
The multilevel governance (MLG) concept, adapted to the urban perspective, provides the 
theoretical framework behind this article (summarized in Table 1). Two dimensions of MLG 
serve as the explanatory factors to analyze the locational policies agendas in SCCs.  
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Table 1: Theoretical framework 
Overarching 
framework 
Multilevel Governance 
Concepts 
Explanatory factor 1 Explanatory factor 2 Phenomena to be explained: 
Vertical dimension:  
Local autonomy 
Local dimension: Urban 
governance arrangements  
Locational policies agendas 
Operationalization 
of concepts 
- Governing structure  
- Local tax autonomy 
 
- Social production 
model 
- Tax maximization 
- Development and public 
funds 
 
The MLG concept theorizes the decision-making of multiple intervening actors that operate on 
multiple scales without a structuring authority (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Horak and Young 
(2012), among others, adapt the MLG concept to the urban perspective. They propose two MLG 
dimensions: The vertical dimension analyzes the interaction between governments at multiple 
levels in policy-making, whereas the local dimension examines the involvement of non-
governmental actors in the policy-making process (Young 2012, pp. 5–6). Consequently, Horak 
(2012, p. 339) defines MLG as “a mode of policy making that involves complex interactions 
among multiple levels of government and social forces.” 
Both dimensions are crucial for a comparative analysis of urban policy in general (e.g. Gurr 
and King 1987; Kantor and Savitch 2005; Sellers 2005), and these dimensions are especially 
relevant for the comparative study of locational policies in SCCs. The vertical dimension 
encompasses contextual elements, national variations and institutional differences (Kübler and 
Paganao 2012). To capture the influence of higher-level governments is important because the 
different layers of government intersect much more profoundly in SCCs than in any other types 
of cites (Campbell 2000, p. 10). The local dimension is essential for understanding policy-
making in economic policies, such as locational policies, because it accounts for the influence 
of private actors in urban governance arrangements (e.g. Stone 1989). 
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Phenomena to be explained: Locational Policies Agendas 
Locational policies aim to enhance the competitiveness of a locality (Brenner 1999). They rely 
on the identification, development, and promotion of place-specific assets because these assets 
may allow places to escape from a fully competitive, and therefore level, global market 
(Kaufmann and Arnold 2017; Kaufmann 2018). Cities possess varying local resources and 
operate under varying institutional and economic constraints. All of these factors shape urban 
economic policies (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Locational policies can take many forms. 
Kaufmann and Arnold (2017) distinguish between six types of locational policies: (1) 
innovation policies, which facilitate knowledge flows between a region’s crucial actors, 2) 
image building policies, (3) business prerequisites strategies that encompass real estate, 
infrastructure, and tax policies, (4) strategies to attract firms, (5) the establishment of 
coordination structures for locational policies, and (6) strategies to tap into higher-tier 
governmental funds. Similarly, Jonas and Ward (2007) mention policies that foster start-ups, 
attract outside investments and encourage new urban governance arrangements. These kinds of 
locational policies have expanded substantially in their quantity and they also take new and 
varied forms (Young 2012, p. 18). Uyarra (2010, p. 132) emphasizes that locational policies 
appear in complex bundles, occupy multiple policy domains, and are often mutually dependent. 
Given that city governments formulate locational policies based on local assets, capital cities 
may rely on their capital city status when devising locational policies (Kaufmann 2018; Mayer 
et al. 2016). 
Vertical Dimension: Local Autonomy  
The vertical dimension assesses the local autonomy of cities, which can be more or less be 
constrained by higher-tier governments (Goldsmith 1995; Gurr and King 1987; Sellers and 
Lidström 2007). The local autonomy of capital cities tends to be more limited than the local 
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autonomy of other cities in the national urban system. James Madison provides the intellectual 
justification for such capital city specific local autonomy constraints in The Federalist Papers, 
no. 43, where he argues that the U.S. capital should be independent from state or commercial 
interests (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 2005). Political science scholars emphasize that capital 
cities are torn between the conflicting priorities of serving the nation state as a whole and 
serving their local residents (Harris 1995; Rowat 1968, 1973). These conflicting priorities are 
known as the classic capital city conflict, the challenge of dual democracy, or simply as the 
Rowat thesis (Harris 1995; Nagel 2013b). Following Page and Goldsmith (1987, 5–7), I 
examine SCCs’ local autonomy by focusing on their constitutional status and on their degree 
of financial and fiscal autonomy.1  
The constitutional status of capital cities, also known as their governing structures, has been a 
prominent research object since the beginning of comparative capital city research. Rowat 
(1968; 1973) compares seventeen federal capitals and distinguishes between three types of 
governing structures: (1) a capital city located in a special district, (2) a capital city as a city-
state that is simultaneously a constitutive unit of its nation, and (3) a capital city located within 
a province, state or canton with no special status. This threefold distinction is prevalent in 
capital city research (Harris 1995; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). Each of these governing 
types assigns more or less local autonomy to capital cities. Capital cities as special districts lack 
the constitutional sovereignty that states/provinces enjoy, and thus the national government can 
exert considerable control over them. Capital cities as city-states have the power and 
responsibilities of both cities and states/provinces, and they tend to have more power and more 
local autonomy than other cities in the national urban system. A capital city in a state/province 
possesses the same legal status as other cities in the national urban system. The local autonomy 
of these types of capitals do not tend to be very restricted, however, they fall under the 
responsibility of their respective state/province (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009).  
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Michael Goldsmith (1995, 2012) highlights the importance of the national tax systems under 
which local governments operate. The national tax system determines jurisdictions’ ability to 
raise funds (Goldsmith and Page 1987, p. 7). The proportion of all national tax revenue collected 
at the local level is a straightforward measurement of local tax autonomy (see OECD 2014). 
Furthermore, high local autonomy means that local governments have a variety of tax 
instruments available, such as personal income tax, corporate income tax, and property tax on 
land and real estate. In a low local tax autonomy context, some of these tax instruments are the 
prerogative of higher-tier political entities. To compensate for the lack of local tax instruments 
available, higher-tier political entities transfer a substantial amount of public money to finance 
local budgets (Goldsmith 2012, p. 137). Local governments are more likely to behave 
competitive in their formulation of locational policies when they operate in a high local tax 
autonomy setting (Kaufmann and Sager 2018). 
SCCs must endure capital city-specific local tax autonomy constraints. For example, 
Washington, D.C., as the Federal District, does not enjoy the same tax rights as U.S. states. 
Furthermore, tax exemptions on property belonging to the national government, as well as on 
property belonging to foreign governments (such as embassies or consulates), restrict the local 
tax base of capital cities. The national government may compensate for these restrictions to the 
property tax base with payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009).  
Local Dimension: Urban Governance Arrangements  
The local dimension integrates a key aspect of the urban politics literature: the interplay 
between local public and local private actors in governing the city. The two seminal studies in 
urban politics that constitute the community power debate (Dahl 1961; Hunter 1953) suggest 
that local business actors substantially influence urban politics. Three decades after the 
community power debate, the growth machine theory (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 
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1976) affirms the power of land and property owners, together with other growth-oriented 
actors, such as such as investment firms, developers, construction firms, local utility companies, 
local media, small, and self-employed businesses, as well as universities and cultural 
institutions. A commitment to economic growth based on tangible benefits unites these diverse 
actors (Harding 1995, p. 42). The growth machine theory criticizes that the exchange-value of 
property and land trumps its use-value. The urban regime analysis (Stone 1989, 1993), in a 
nutshell, argues that popular control (votes) and investments in local development projects 
(money) are the two decisive resources that create the ‘capacity to act’ in an urban arena. This 
‘capacity to act’ is the foundation of Stone’s ‘social-production model’, which proposes a more 
diffuse form of power: the facilitative ‘power to’ rather than the absolutist ‘power over’ (Stone 
1989, p. 229). The ‘social production model’ emphasizes that decision-making in local 
economic development does not follow a formal line of authority. A wide array of private actors 
participates in decision-making processes because they provide essential investments. Business 
actors are strategic actors who look beyond specific local economic development projects and 
seek to influence the general locational policies agenda (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and 
Rodriguez 2002). 
Given the difficulties of the urban regime analysis to travel through time and space (e.g. Pierre 
2014), I draw on the ‘social production model’ as the crucial analytical element for examining 
‘urban governance arrangements’. Stone (2015) acknowledges that socio-economic 
restructuring has altered the urban political arena and he argues that: (1) there is less urgency 
to conduct big development projects, such as expressways or business city centers, (2) 
corporations are not as place-bound as they were before, and (3) diverse non-governmental 
organizations are now important urban political actors. All in all, the post-industrial city does 
not seem to be a breeding ground for a stable governing coalition with a cohesive and ambitious 
policy agenda. Thus, I analyze the interactions of public and private actors in the formulation 
of locational policies through the perspective of urban governance arrangements. As I 
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demonstrate in the case studies, urban governance arrangements are distinctive in SCCs because 
public actors occupy a central role in these arrangements due to the lack of an industrial history 
that may have otherwise produced powerful business actors.  
Research Design 
This article employs a comparative case study design that includes four SCCs in OECD 
countries, namely Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, and Washington, D.C. The research design 
juxtaposes a cross-case analysis with a within-case analysis that together allow for reliable 
causal inferences (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, p. 10). The case selection is based on 
variance in the explanatory factors. The four cases are a theory-driven sample since they vary 
in the proposed explanatory factors but share many similarities in contextual variables (see 
Table 2). Focusing on SCCs in Europe and North America enables me to control for some of 
the economic and political context. Furthermore, the exclusion of the other six cases from the 
population of SCCs in OECD countries2 can be justified due to their lack of comparability and 
due to practical reasons. Berlin, Jerusalem, and Rome fit the economic definition of SCCs, but 
they are the primary historical, symbolic, and cultural cities of their nations. I exclude Ankara 
because of its rather idiosyncratic political and cultural setting. I primarily exclude Canberra 
and Wellington, despite their good fit in the category of SCCs, for practical reasons, as I would 
have required considerable resources to be able to conduct field research in Oceania. 
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Table 2: Summary of selected cases  
Type of factor Factor Bern Ottawa The Hague Washington, 
D.C. 
Controlled factor 
Type of capital 
city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Controlled factor 
Type of country Western 
OECD 
country 
Western 
OECD 
country 
Western 
OECD country 
Western 
OECD 
country 
Context factor Inhabitants 131,554 957,148 514,861 672,228 
Context factor 
 
State type Federal state Federal state Decentralized 
unitary state 
Federal state 
Explanatory factor 1 
Local autonomy     
- Governing 
structures 
 
 
City in a state 
(i.e. canton) 
 
City in a 
state (i.e. 
province) 
City in a state 
(i.e. province) 
 
Federal 
District  
 
- Local tax 
autonomy 
High Rather low Low High 
Explanatory factor 2 
Urban 
governance 
arrangement 
Government 
dominated 
arrangement 
Government-
developer 
arrangement 
Corporatist 
arrangement 
Business-
developer-
government 
arrangement 
Phenomena 
to be explained 
Locational 
policies agenda 
Tax 
maximization 
Development 
and public 
funds 
Development 
and public 
funds 
Tax 
maximization 
and 
development 
 
This article relies on 91 semi-structured, in-person interviews with 103 relevant decision 
makers in the four SCCs (see Table 3). I carefully selected interview partners to ensure 
sufficient variety within the cases and consistency between them. The interviews took place 
during three-month field studies in all four SCCs between summer 2014 and summer 2015. 
There is an anonymized list of interview partners in the Appendix (see Table A1). To enhance 
confidence in the observations, I triangulate reactive data (interviews) with non-reactive data 
(such as secondary literature, reports, databases, strategic papers, and city budgets). 
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Table 3: Summary of interviews 
 
Type of Interviewee 
Bern Ottawa The Hague Washington, 
D.C. 
Total 
- Public official 
(local, second-tier and 
national government) 
6 5 9 8 28 
- Economic development 
agent 
- Regional coordination 
agent 
3 6 4 4 17 
- Business actor 
- Private interest group 
representative 
7 6 5 8 26 
- Expert 
- Academic 
3 4 6 7 20 
Total 19 21 24 27 91 
 
I present all four case studies in the same order: first, I briefly outline the reasoning behind the 
selection of each city as the capital, next I describe the local autonomy and the urban governance 
arrangement, and then I explain how these two explanatory factors influence locational policies 
agendas. The analytical weight of this article rests on the cross-case comparison in the 
discussion section.  
Bern 
The city of Bern was chosen as the capital of Switzerland in 1848 for pragmatic reasons. At 
that time, Lucerne, a conservative catholic stronghold, was still skeptical of the new Swiss 
Confederation, and Zurich was already too economically powerful (Kübler 2009; Stadler 1971). 
Furthermore, the choice of the city of Bern as the capital city was an inclusionary gesture at this 
time of nation state building due to its central geographic location and its proximity to the 
French speaking parts of Switzerland (Stadler 1971, p. 582). 
Local Autonomy 
Swiss municipalities enjoy high local autonomy. They have residual powers, i.e. they can 
legislate in areas where superior bodies have not legislated (Kübler 2009, p. 245). Legally, the 
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capital city is treated like any other Swiss municipality and thus, there are no capital city specific 
constraints. In the Swiss political system, cantons are the most powerful political entities with 
regard to policy formulation and implementation (Sager, Ingold and Balthasar 2017).  
Local tax autonomy is also high in Switzerland. Local governments are able to levy personal 
income taxes, corporate income taxes, and property taxes. They also have the power to set their 
own tax rates. Municipalities raise 15.16 % of all Swiss taxes (OECD 2014). Taxes levied on 
personal income are by far the highest source of revenue for the city of Bern (see Table 4). 
Other than a lump sum that the federal level provides for cultural activities, the city of Bern 
does not receive any compensation from the Swiss Confederation. However, it receives about 
15 % of its revenue from financial transfers from the canton. 
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Table 4: Local revenue composition of the city of Bern 
Budgetary items 
 
Swiss Franc (CHF) 
in Millions 
Percentage (%) 
Property tax 39.77 2.63 
Personal income tax 642.48 42.47 
Corporate income tax 150.06 9.92 
Other taxes 61.22 4.05 
User fees 200.70 13.27 
Patents and concessions 1.65 0.11 
Assets 154.10 10.19 
Cantonal governmental transfers 167.60 11.08 
Cantonal fiscal equalization 
scheme 
63.25 4.18 
Miscellaneous 31.84 2.10 
Total 1,512.69 100 
Sources: Federal Finance Administration (2016), data from 2014.  
Notes: Sales and gross receipt taxes are the prerogatives of the federal level. The lump sum of one million CHF 
annually provided for cultural activities is not recorded in the data of the Federal Finance Administration and is 
thus not displayed in this table. 
 
Urban Governance Arrangement 
Public actors dominate Bern’s urban governance arrangement. While there are local private 
interest groups that share a common interest in the economic advancement of the city of Bern, 
these groups are only loosely connected and are not very influential. In a book about the 
international activities of European cities, Van der Heiden (2010, p. 44) states: “The few 
international activities of the City of Bern are clearly in the hands of the city administration. 
Private actors and the public are wholly excluded from Bern’s few international activities”. 
Additionally, a comparative study of large-scale urban construction projects in Swiss cities 
finds that the Bernese local government holds the key position, whereas private actors only 
enter the scene during the realization of these projects (Lambelet 2017). This powerful role held 
by the local government also applies to locational policies. For example, an influential business 
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representative assesses the interactions between public and private actors as much more 
dynamic in Zurich than in Bern (Interview 2). Other business representatives blame the political 
dominance of the social democratic and the green parties, which they say hinders the ability for 
business representatives to contribute their ideas (Interviews: 5 & 7). Furthermore, profound 
direct democratic institutions are a special feature of Bernese city politics that limits business 
influence. Bernese citizens are automatically called to the ballot box when a projected public 
expenditure is expected to exceed seven million Swiss Francs or if a law would modify the local 
land use or local housing policy. Additionally, citizens must approve the city budget and tax 
rate annually (Kaufmann et al. 2016).  
Locational Policies Agenda 
The city of Bern pursues a tax maximization locational policies agenda. It focuses on being 
attractive for residents through the formulation of locational policies that seek to enhance its 
residents’ quality of life. These locational strategies include maintaining green spaces, 
preserving the old town, establishing schools for expatriate children, and supporting cultural 
activities (Interviews: 3, 6 & 18). These efforts aim to attract wealthy taxpayers to the city of 
Bern in order to increase the personal income tax base that currently comprises 42 % of the 
local revenue. The city’s locational policies do not focus on acquiring firms because it is the 
canton of Bern that holds the discretionary power to offer tax incentives to firms (Interview 6), 
and because corporate income taxes only comprise 10 % of local revenue. In general, the city 
of Bern does not formulate many economic-oriented locational policies. Instead, it concentrates 
on quality of life issues, and it positions itself as the political center of Switzerland by arguing 
that a strong capital city is in the interest of the whole nation state. 
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Ottawa 
Ottawa was a farmer and lumber town prior to being named as the capital of the Province of 
Canada in 1857. Queen Victoria made the final decision to choose Ottawa as the capital 
(Andrew 2013, pp. 86–87). Egglestone (1961, p. 102) argues that Ottawa was the only place 
that the majority of the existing Canadian cities considered to be an acceptable choice as the 
capital. With the establishment of the Canadian Confederation in 1867, Ottawa became the 
federal capital (Tassonyi 2009, p. 57).  
Local Autonomy 
The Canadian Constitution does not recognize municipalities. Its only reference to 
municipalities is as ‘creatures of the provinces’. The city of Ottawa operates under the statutory 
framework of the province of Ontario. The National Capital Commission (NCC) exerts direct 
control over the planning, zoning and building of federal land and therefore constrains the local 
autonomy of Ottawa compared to other Canadian municipalities. “This means that neither the 
provincial nor the local authority has any rights of taxation, legislation, or regulation over such 
property, except what the national authority chooses to give it” (Taylor 2011, p. 28). The NCC 
is the single largest property owner in Ottawa, with direct control over approximately 10 % of 
all land in Ottawa, including some very prominent areas in Downtown (Champagne 2011, p. 
46; Interviews: 52, 54 & 58).  
Canadian local governments raise 9.69 % of all tax revenue in Canada. Three tax revenue 
categories exist for municipalities in Ontario: property taxes, user charges, and transfers from 
other governmental levels (mostly from the provincial government) (Siegel 2009, pp. 50–51). 
Governmental money transfers consist of four categories: (1) conditional grants, (2) 
unconditional grants, (3) payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILTs), and (4) revenue sharing. The 
PILTs that Ottawa receives are remarkable from a comparative perspective on the financing of 
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capital cities because not many other capital cities receive such generous PILTs (Slack and 
Chattopadhyay 2009).  
Table 5 summarizes the revenue breakdown of the city of Ottawa. Property taxes are extremely 
important as they comprise 47 % of the city’s revenue. User fees account for another 24 % of 
revenue. The city of Ottawa raises 75 % of its budget independently. Government grants (19 
%) and payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (6 %) add up to 25 % of the revenue that comes from higher-
tier governments.  
Table 5: Local revenue composition of the city of Ottawa 
Budgetary items Canadian 
Dollars (CAD) 
in Millions 
Percentage (%) 
Property tax 1,455.26 47.08 
Fees and services 735.78 23.80 
Federal transfers 499.81 16.17 
Provincial transfers 79.56 2.57 
Payments in lieu of 
taxes 
191.88 6.21 
Miscellaneous 128.98 4.17 
Total 3,091.27 100 
Source: City of Ottawa (2016), data from 2015. 
Urban Governance Arrangement 
Public actors and developers dominate the urban governance arrangement in Ottawa. Horak 
(2012, p. 356) argues that large firms, property developers, and chambers of commerce are 
important for governance arrangements in Canadian cities. According to the interview partners, 
chambers of commerce and large firms do not exercise much influence in Ottawa. Since the 
crash of Ottawa’s pivotal high-tech sector in the early 2000s, Ottawa no longer houses a strong 
industry and thus, the chambers of commerce lack influence and money (Interview 49). An 
expert explains the consequences:  
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Here in Ottawa, no urban regime exists, except for the developers. (…) Local developers in 
Ottawa are very important in running the city. There are about 50 influential developers that have 
something to say. They do not want to be organized because than they would be recognized as 
political players. It is a diffuse form of power. (Interview 58)  
 
Another expert is similarly trenchant in describing the role of the developers in Ottawa: 
“Developers are the only people that have an influence on city hall. It is not the chamber of 
commerce or other organized business interests” (Interview 48). Developers are important 
because they are able to form ad-hoc coalitions when pushing for certain issues (Interview 45) 
and “they get things done” (Interview 61).  
Locational Policies Agenda 
Ottawa’s locational policies agenda seeks to increase the value of its property tax base and to 
attract funds from higher-tier governments. In terms of the former, the city hall plays an 
especially active role in Ottawa’s Downtown because of the high prices in this area. Property 
taxes comprise 47 % of the local revenue. As a consequence, the city hall seeks to ensure low 
commercial vacancy rates by cooperating with side locators, offering tax incentives for 
renovating Downtown real estate, and prioritizing permissions for Downtown real estate 
renovations in a fast-track procedure (Interviews: 44, 46 & 55). The strong role developers’ 
play in the urban governance arrangement fuels this development-oriented strategy. Developers 
are able to advance certain development projects in a quick and non-bureaucratic manner 
(Interviews: 45 & 61). Higher-tier public funds account for a quarter of local revenue. There 
are ample opportunities to request public funds because many higher-tier governmental funds 
compensate the low tax autonomy of Canadian local governments.  
The Hague 
In the Middle Ages, The Hague served as a neutral meeting place, a site for negotiations, and a 
venue for arbitration for the powerful Dutch city-states (van Krieken and McKay 2005, p. 3). 
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Its historic role made Prince Maurice, in 1585, to place the Dutch political and judicial 
organizations there. However, Amsterdam is the official capital city of the Netherlands because 
during the French occupation of the Netherlands (1806-1813), Napoleon Bonaparte and his 
brother, King Louis, preferred to settle in Amsterdam. After the withdrawal of Napoleon in 
1813, Dutch decision makers returned the seat of government to The Hague but left Amsterdam 
with capital city status. 
Local Autonomy 
The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state with a strong central government. Its provinces 
are the least powerful level of the Dutch political system. Since the 1980s, the policy 
responsibilities of the municipalities have been extended (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, pp. 212-
214). Dutch municipalities deliver public services in many policy areas, such as social 
assistance, public housing, education, and cultural activities. Central government funds largely 
finance these services. The Hague does not face additional constraints due to its capital city 
function and the Dutch political system does not offer compensation payments to its capital 
city.  
Dutch municipalities have low local tax autonomy. The local level only raises 3.6 % of all 
Dutch taxes (OECD 2014). Thus, Dutch local governments rely heavily on central government 
funds. Local governments have three main sources of income: (1) local taxes (mainly on 
property) and local user fees, (2) unconditional government grants, and (3) conditional 
government grants (Dersken and Schaap 2010). This low local tax autonomy manifests itself in 
The Hague’s budget (see Table 6). Local taxes comprise 4 % of the budget. Property taxes 
constitute 3.2 % of the budget, and other taxes (such as dog or tourist taxes) comprise another 
1 % of the budget. Consequently, unconditional government grants (about 45 % of the budget) 
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and conditional government grants (about 18 % of the budget) are important for sustaining the 
budget of The Hague.  
Table 6: Local revenue composition of the city of The Hague 
Budgetary Items Euro (EUR) 
in Millions 
Percentage (%) 
Property tax 80.50 3.23 
Other local taxes 24.70 0.99 
Unconditional government grants 1,129.60 45.31 
Conditional government grants 455.80 18.28 
Other income (user fees, interests, 
dividends, and leases) 
802.60 32.19 
Total  2,493.20 100 
Source: City of The Hague (2014, 242–44). Outlook data for 2015. 
Urban Governance Arrangement 
The Hague’s urban governance arrangement be described as corporatist. This means that private 
interest groups and the government have a relationship that is based on exchange and 
cooperation rather than on competition. In Dutch policy-making, employer organizations, labor 
unions, and governmental entities cooperate to address issues in a consensus-based, non-
institutionalized, and non-confrontational way (Andeweg and Irwin 2014). The local level 
reproduces this corporatist tradition. In The Hague, the economic agenda is discussed in 
institutionalized meetings in the so-called Administrative Consultations for Economic Affairs 
(Bestuurlijk Overleg Economische Zaken), which consists of members of labor unions, 
employer organizations, and the city (Interviews: 34 & 35).  
Locational Policies Agenda 
The Hague aims to attract higher-tier governmental funds and focuses on the development of 
real estate and infrastructure. Vertical money transfers comprise 64 % of The Hague’s local 
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revenue and attracting economic development funds is thus of special importance to its 
locational policies agenda. For example, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs’ top sector 
program provides funding for The Hague’s cluster organization in cyber security sector, called 
The Hague Security Delta (Interviews: 25 & 41). Given the importance of these funds, the city 
of The Hague employs specialists entrusted with the task of tapping into various public funding 
opportunities (Interviews: 40 & 42). As a second priority, The Hague focuses on the 
development of modern real estate projects because property tax is the only important locally 
raised tax. For example, The Hague invests a great deal into its Central Business District 
(Interview 42). Local government officials explain that “all Dutch municipalities largely focus 
on developing its physical infrastructure (…) It can be explained with the locally raised real 
estate taxes” (Interview 25). An expert mentions, in a somewhat sarcastic manner, that real 
estate development “is all that local governments do in the Netherlands” (Interview 32).  
Washington D.C. 
The establishment of a new U.S. capital city along the Potomac River was an intentional move 
to insulate the federal government from the influence of states and commercial centers (Ghandi 
et al. 2009, p. 271). D.C. is a planned city founded in 1791 and initiated as the U.S. capital in 
1800. The U.S. Constitution does not specify the location of the District. Gilliland (2013) argues 
that the decision to move the U.S. capital to its current location was a compromise between 
Northern states, who succeeded in having their war debts nationalized, and Southern states, who 
extracted the capital from the influence of Pennsylvanian Northerners.3 It was President George 
Washington who finally decided on the exact location of the proposed District, and he chose an 
area close to his own home in Mount Vernon, Virginia (Gilliland 2013, p. 35).  
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Local Autonomy 
The governing structure of Washington D.C. is described as Home Rule under Congressional 
supervision (Nagel 2013a). A non-voting member in the U.S. House of Representatives is the 
only representative of District residents. Congress can influence the District’s policy-making 
by either blocking spending on particular budgetary items or by directly vetoing D.C. laws 
(Nagel 2013a, pp. 64–65). Congress has used this power extensively (Fauntroy 2003; Nagel 
2013a, p. 71). Interview partners consider congressional oversight to be highly controversial, 
especially with regard to D.C.’s current policy initiatives, such as legalizing abortion and the 
consumption of marihuana, establishing a needle exchange program, and tightening fire arms 
regulations (Interviews: 75, 79, 81, 84 & 88). Congress has made use of its “authority over 
locally generated funds as a means to enact its own legislative provision through so-called 
‘social riders’ (…). These ‘social riders’ specifically impact District policy, however, they 
actually reflect broader political debates” (Ghandi et al. 2009, p. 279). The federal 
administration can further intervene in local matters via The National Capital Planning 
Commission (NCPC), which represents interests over federal land and buildings.  
D.C. bears the responsibility of a state, as well as that of a county, a city, and a school district 
(Ghandi et al. 2009, p. 265). In comparison to states, the Home Rule Act of 1973 diminishes 
D.C.’s personal income tax base by prohibiting it from levying the so-called Commuter Tax on 
the income of non-residents that work in the District. Non-residents earn two thirds of income 
in the District (Ghandi et al. 2009, pp. 279–280), which would have accounted for an additional 
US$ 2.26 billion in tax revenue in 2005 (Yilmaz 2009). Furthermore, the tax on currently tax-
exempt properties would have accounted for an additional tax revenue of about US$ 540 million 
in 2005 (Yilmaz 2009). The District does not receive payments-in-lieu-of-taxes for most of its 
federal and foreign properties (Ghandi et al. 2009, p. 280). Overall, D.C.’s constrained tax 
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autonomy creates a structural income deficit, which is seen as a reason for its historically high 
taxes (Interviews: 69 & 89; O’Cleireacain 1997, pp. 6–10).  
Table 7 shows D.C.’s revenue composition. The 28 % of federal governmental transfers stems 
from the fact that the district has the same responsibilities as different levels of government, 
such as state, county, city, and school district. This percentage would be significantly higher if 
the US$ 1.3 billion annual compensation payment would be reflected in the budget (Nagel 
2013a, p. 65). Taxes raise 44 % of the budget. Property tax, sales and gross receipt tax, and 
personal income tax account for more or less the same percentage of revenue.  
Table 7: Local revenue composition in the city of Washington D.C.  
Budgetary item United States 
Dollars (US$) 
in Millions 
Percentage (%) 
Federal governmental transfers 3,982 28.26 
Property tax 1,970 13.98 
Sales and gross receipt tax 1,511 10.72 
Individual income tax 1,641 11.64 
Corporate income tax 453 3.21 
Other taxes 605 4.30 
Charges, utility revenue and 
miscellaneous revenue 
3,931 27.89 
Total 14,093 100 
Source: United States Census Bureau, (2015): State and Local Government Finance, data from 2013. 
Urban Governance Arrangement 
Public officials, business actors, leaders of non-profit organizations, and developers all engage 
in an intense, non-institutionalized discussion of locational policies. Business communities in 
the District are well organized and business organizations have access to local public leaders 
via their own networks and not via institutionalized access channels (Interviews: 71, 77, 90). In 
the case of big infrastructure projects (e.g. the renovation of Union Station or the construction 
of the Convention center), business organizations activate their networks to accelerate these 
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development projects and to ensure their funding (Interview 69). Different business 
organizations in the District meet each other informally and sporadically in order to find 
common ground and to share their priorities (Interview 87). Most of these business 
organizations also hire lobbyists that represent their interests. Thus, business interests in D.C. 
are well heard despite their lack of institutional access to public leaders (Interview 75).  
Interview partners do not describe the urban governance arrangement as a typical urban regime 
(Interviews: 75, 77, 88 & 90). The absence of a strong industry in D.C. makes developers very 
influential in District politics (Interviews: 69, 80 & 82). Thus, an expert calls the urban 
governance arrangement “rather a growth machine type than an urban regime. It applies more, 
because D.C. has no industries, but it has land to develop” (Interview 88).  
Locational Policies Agenda 
D.C. follows a tax maximization and a development-oriented locational policies agenda. The 
development of neighborhoods and large infrastructure projects aim to lure wealthy tax payers 
into the District in order to increase the personal income tax base (Interviews: 73, 84 & 86; 
Hyra and Prince 2016; Sturtevant 2013). The District government increasingly focuses on so-
called place-based development that aims to transform neighborhoods into areas that have a 
high quality of life by incentivizing the establishment of small retail businesses and cultural 
institutions, as well as improving schools, and lowering crime rates. An economic development 
agent explains:  
Our major success was to invest in place. We invested in neighborhoods, transportation 
infrastructure, retail opportunities, schools, and libraries to make D.C. more attractive for talent. 
(…) To invest in place is our key narrative that we are telling. D.C. is viewed as a talent attractor. 
D.C. did a great job and now we have to be careful how we avoid the bad symptoms of 
gentrifications such as unaffordability of housing and real estate. (Interview 73). 
 
However, most of the District’s current economic development strategy focuses on real estate 
development (Interview 84). The District’s 5 Year Economic Development Strategy, which 
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aims to generate 100,000 additional jobs, exemplifies this focus since the strategy expects that 
more than half of the jobs (55,000) will be created in the real estate and construction sectors 
(The District of Columbia 2012, p. 12). The district transfers brown fields and underused 
facilities to developers (Interview 91). The interplay between the D.C. administration and 
developers enables this development-oriented locational policies agenda (Interviews: 80, 86 & 
88).  
Furthermore, D.C. asks for federal compensation payments due to its capital city specific 
constraints. Since the Home Rule Act of 1973, which implicitly acknowledges the unique fiscal 
role of the District, the D.C. administration has sought to increase federal compensation 
payments (Ghandi et al. 2009, p. 274). For example, the Revitalization Act of 1997 increased 
federal payments from around US$ 660 million to US$ 1.3 billion annually. Since the turn of 
the millennium, D.C. has lobbied for US$ one billion in federal dollars to help fund the 
modernization of its outdated infrastructure (Interviews: 79, 81, 88 & 90). In these negotiations 
with the federal level, D.C. decision makers explicitly refer to its capital city status. A local 
lobbyist explains:  
We launched the discussions for the new infrastructure deal because the Obama administration 
came into power. We thought the Clinton administration gave us the Revitalization Act, the 
Bush administration gave us some land that we could develop and so we can also give the 
Obama administration a choice to improve the District. The commuter tax was always the 
elephant in the room over the years because every state can do that and because it is a lot of 
money given the number of commuters. We thought we are probably not getting the commuter 
tax, but we can negotiate a compensation for it. (Interview 81) 
 
Comparing and explaining locational policies agendas 
The cross-case comparison reveals that governing structures of capital cities, local tax 
autonomy, and urban governance arrangements are relevant for explaining locational policies 
agendas. However, the effects of these explanatory factors on locational policies vary in terms 
of their strength and magnitude (see Table 8).  
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Table 8: Summary of case studies  
Case Locational Policies Agendas Explanatory Factors 
Bern - Increasing personal income tax base by 
investing in quality of life 
- High local tax autonomy 
Ottawa - Increasing property tax base by supporting 
development projects 
- Low local tax autonomy and developers 
- Attracting higher-tier governmental funds - Low local tax autonomy 
- Asking for compensation payments - Capital city specific local autonomy constraints 
The Hague - Attracting higher-tier governmental funds - Low local tax autonomy 
- Increasing the property tax base by 
supporting development projects 
- Low local tax autonomy 
Washington 
D.C. 
- Increasing tax bases by place-based 
neighborhood development and large-scale 
development projects 
- High local tax autonomy and developers 
- Asking for compensation payments - Capital city specific local autonomy constraints 
 
Governing Structures of Capital Cities 
The governing structures of capital cities can explain whether or not SCCs request 
compensation payments. In the context of SCCs, compensation payments are seen as locational 
policies because they are important for financing capital cities and these payments are subject 
to intense negotiations between local governments and relevant national organizations 
(Kaufmann 2018). Of the four SCCs analyzed, Ottawa and D.C. ask for compensation 
payments. In both North American capitals, local autonomy is constrained by an agency that 
represents interests over federal land. In D.C., local autonomy constraints are more profound, 
to the extreme that the Congress has de facto oversight over local policy-making. In neither of 
the two European SCCs does a national land-use agency exist, nor is there a mechanism for an 
actor from the federal level to intervene in local policy-making. 
The comparison suggests that a city’s status prior to its selection as capital is important for 
explaining its capital city specific constraints. Both European SCCs exercised important 
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functions within their national urban systems at the time they were chosen as capitals. For this 
reason, it seems unlikely that Bern or The Hague would have accepted local autonomy cutbacks 
brought along by capital city status. In contrast, the two North American capitals were built 
from scratch, or were primarily developed to serve as the capital. Thus, it is important to 
differentiate between purpose-built capitals and purposely-selected capitals when studying the 
local autonomy of SCCs. This distinction enriches the existing threefold categorization 
proposed by Rowat (1973) (see second section of the article). 
Local Tax Autonomy 
The priorities of locational policies agendas (in Table 8) are mirrored in the revenue categories 
of the local budgets (see Table 9). The importance of the individual revenue categories can be 
explained by local tax autonomy. Local governments exhibit a strong functional orientation 
towards increasing their most important revenue sources via the formulation of locational 
policies. In Bern, personal income tax comprises 42 % of local revenue, which explains its 
strong focus on increasing the city’s quality of life in order to attract wealthy residents. In 
Ottawa, property tax comprises 47 % of local revenue, thereby explaining its focus on 
development projects and its efforts to maintain real estate values. In The Hague, governmental 
transfers account for 64 % of local revenue. This explains The Hague’s activities that attract 
governmental economic development funds. D.C. pursues a mix of locational policy 
instruments, which its rather diversified budget mirrors.  
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Table 9: Local revenue comparison of the four SCCs 
Budgetary items Bern (%) Ottawa (%) The Hague (%) Washington, 
D.C. (%) 
Property tax 2.63 47.08 3.23 13.98 
Personal income tax 42.47 - - 11.64 
Corporate income tax 9.92 - - 3.21 
Other taxes 4.05 0.00 0.99 15.02 
Governmental transfers 15.26 18.74 63.59 28.26 
Payments in lieu of taxes - 6.21 - - 
User fees, assets, and 
miscellaneous revenue 
25.67 27.97 32.19 27.89 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Sources are listed in the case studies 
 
All in all, local tax autonomy is a game changer for locational policies agendas. Differences in 
local tax autonomy lead to different opportunity structures for how local governments can raise 
funds. These different opportunity structures yield two ideal types of locational policies 
agendas. One is that low local tax autonomy encourages a development and public funds 
locational policies agenda, which is found in Ottawa and The Hague. In these cases, local 
governments prioritize infrastructure and real estate development in order to boost the property 
tax base, which is the major independently-raised source of local revenue. Higher-tier 
government entities compensate for this low local tax autonomy by offering various public 
funds.  In contrast, high local tax autonomy leads to a tax maximization locational policies 
agenda. The focus of these kinds of agendas is to maximize the revenue from the multiple tax 
instruments at hand. This ideal type of locational policies agendas, found in Bern and D.C., 
aims to reap the benefit of its locational policies activities in the form of various tax revenues. 
Since personal income tax is the most important revenue category for municipalities in the 
Swiss tax system, Bern seeks to boost its personal income tax base. Similarly, the importance 
of the property tax and the personal income tax for D.C. leads to a focus on place-based 
development and infrastructure development.  
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Urban Governance Arrangements 
The cross-case comparison reveals the important role that local governments and developers 
play in the urban governance arrangements of SCCs. The central role of local governments 
somewhat contrasts with the assumptions of the ‘social production model’ At the time of 
Stone’s study of Atlanta (1946-1988), business elites provided crucial resources, such as 
money, land, and technical expertise, whereas the local government provided political 
legitimacy. With the exception of D.C., local governments are the central players in urban 
governance arrangements in these four SCCs, and business elites are largely missing. While in 
Bern public actors exploit this position in order to exercise a dominant role, city administrations 
in The Hague and Ottawa operate in an integrative and coordinative manner and ensure 
interaction with local private actors. In general, business actors in SCCs are unable to provide 
the variety of resources described in the urban regime theory (Lambelet 2017; Stone 1989; 
1993). In their essence, SCCs are government cities that lack an industrial tradition. In such a 
context, a resource-rich, and thus powerful, business elite was not able to develop. Although 
knowledge-intensive and highly regulated economic sectors are important for the economy of 
SCCs, such ‘ed and med’ firms and organizations do not engage in city politics as a collective 
force (Stone 2015, p. 111). Local governments are able to occupy such a central position 
because business actors are largely absent. Therefore, local governments are in a position to 
lead these urban governance arrangements.  
Only in the two North American SCCs do powerful business actors exist, namely developers. 
In the two European SCCs, developers do not have the same leverage over local politics. The 
locational policies agenda of The Hague also focuses on land and real estate development; 
however, developers do not facilitate these activities. This begs the question: Why are 
developers important in North American cities but not in European ones?  
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First, business elites and local public actors are generally more entangled in North American 
contexts than in Continental Europe (e.g. DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999; Pierre 2005, 2014). 
In the European context, private actors’ institutionalized access to urban politics keep them in 
check to a certain degree. As the case of The Hague exemplifies: developers were important in 
the construction of the Central Business District, but they do not influence locational policy 
formulation because it is the competence of the institutionalized Administrative Consultations 
for Economic Affairs. Second, cities were at the forefront of territorial expansion as centers of 
trade and commerce in the North American settler countries (Judd and Swanstrom 2015, pp. 3–
4). In these cases, developers satisfied the demand for urban development. Third, property 
taxation is more important in former British Empire countries when compared to other OECD 
countries (Brülhart, Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015, pp. 1138–1139). This importance of 
property taxation, in combination with the strong role of developers, seem to explain the 
development-oriented locational policies agenda in the two North American capitals. Thus, 
national tax systems seem to influence urban governance arrangements. 
Conclusion 
This article combines classic urban politics theories of local autonomy and urban governance 
under the framework of multilevel governance in order to analyze the variety of locational 
policies that secondary capital cities (SCCs) formulate. SCCs are government cities that are 
pressured to enter globalized interurban competition without possessing a competitive political 
economy. The article compares locational policies agendas of four SCCs, namely Bern, Ottawa, 
The Hague, and Washington D.C. The cross-case comparison reveals that SCCs are prone to 
pursue a development-oriented locational policies agenda and that three factors can explain the 
locational policy agendas in SCCs.  
First, local autonomy restrictions, such as nation state oversight over land or city budgets, are 
more common in purpose-built capitals (such as Ottawa and Washington, D.C.) than in 
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purposely-selected capitals (such as Bern and The Hague). These capital city specific local 
autonomy constraints allow purpose-built capitals to request compensation payments. This 
distinction between purpose-built capitals and purposely-selected capitals also seems to be 
relevant when studying other SCCs. For example, in purpose-built Brasilia, national 
government funds compensate for tax-exempt property. In addition, the Brazilian capital 
receives about 7 % of its annual budget from national government subsidies that are meant to 
compensate for capital city burdens (Wolman et al. 2007, p. 16). Pretoria, on the other hand, 
was purposely selected as the host of the South African administration. Pretoria does not have 
to cope with any local autonomy constraints, and it does not demand capital city specific 
compensation payments (Steytler 2009).  
Second, local tax autonomy is a real game changer for locational policies agendas. Decision 
makers in all four cities share the rationale of wanting to be competitive in globalized interurban 
competition, i.e. a neoliberal rationale (Weaver 2018), and they feel pressured by economic 
globalization. Locational policies are formulated as a reaction to these capitalistic pressures. 
The actual locational policies devised in the different SCCs vary, and this is mainly due to the 
national tax system. Low local tax autonomy leads to a locational policies agenda that 
prioritizes infrastructure and real estate development in order to boost the property tax base and 
that is dependent on higher-tier governmental grants. High local tax autonomy leads to a 
locational policies agenda that focuses on the maximization of tax revenue from the multiple 
tax instruments at hand. Thus, national tax systems are highly relevant when studying 
comparative urban economic policy because cities must raise funds to sustain and expand their 
budget. This article buttresses the importance of institutions for explaining policy variations in 
comparative urban economic development research (see for example Kaufmann 2018; Peterson 
1981; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Weaver 2016).  
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Third, local governments are central actors in SCCs’ urban governance arrangements. SCCs 
are government cities that lack an industrial history. In the two North American SCCs, local 
governments and developers join together in urban governance arrangements. The two North 
American capital cities possess a growth-machine type of urban governance (Logan and 
Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976). Such a growth machine was able to thrive in a specific context, 
i.e. SCCs’ absence of an industrial tradition, the development-orientation of North American 
cities, and the primacy of the property tax. Developers seem to fill the vacuum resulting from 
the absence of private actors. Thus, urban governance arrangements in SCCs are distinctive, 
but they may also be found in other cities where private actors are not very influential. The 
urban politics literature discusses similar regime descriptions, such as the government-led pro-
growth regime (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999) and the local-statist regime (Imbroscio 1998). 
Government-led arrangements may become more important in future because the growing ‘ed 
and med’ sectors do not seem to be very interested in engaging in city politics as a collective 
force (Stone 2015). 
This article reveals that locational policy agendas in SCCs do not seem to be qualitatively 
different from other cities with regard to their adherence to the rationale of being competitive 
and with regard to the importance of tax systems for the configuration of their locational 
policies. What I found to be rather specific about locational policy agendas in SCCs is that they 
heavily rely on the physical development of their city. For sure, physical development is a 
locational policy priority in many cities worldwide, but this reliance on physical development 
is very intense in SCCs because of capital city specific tax constraints and path-dependent urban 
power structures in which developers assume a powerful role. Thus, the specific political 
economy of SCCs triggers this development orientation of locational policy agendas in SCCs. 
This also seems to be true for other SCCs. For example, Canberra focuses on developing its 
infrastructure and justifies this locational policies agenda with its capital city status: “[G]iven 
the ACT’s [Australian Capital Territory] lack of manufacturing and resources such as mining 
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and agriculture revenues, planning efficiency and land development are more economically 
significant in the ACT than in any other Australian jurisdiction” (ACT Government 2008, p. 
4). This development focus fuels gentrification and segregation tendencies, as demonstrated in 
two recent books about Washington, D.C. (Hyra and Prince 2016; Hyra 2017) and in an edited 
volume about European capital cities (Tammaru et al. 2015).  
Given the specific political economy of SCCs, the reliance on physical development can not 
just be altered by a realignment of locational policy priorities. However, it is possible to derive 
several strategies from the case studies that could help to minimize the reliance on physical 
development. First, nation states may better support their capital cities by providing them with 
more financial resources or by easing some of their capital city specific local autonomy 
constraints. This would acknowledge the special situation of SCCs and alleviate some pressures 
caused by interurban competition. Second, local governments in SCCs may invest in economic 
sectors where capital cities have a competitive advantage. These include highly-regulated and 
knowledge-intensive sectors, such as medical technology, cyber security, or sustainable energy 
(Mayer et al. 2016, 2018). This would allow SCCs to raise funds beyond physical development. 
Third, the case of Bern shows that direct democratic instruments provide city residents with an 
institutional veto to object large-scale development projects. This may induce local policy 
makers to find alternative locational policy strategies and to be more sensitive about residential 
interests. Finally, and most radically, place-based development, as in the case of Washington, 
D.C., could be accompanied by place-based ownership models of corporations, houses, or land 
(Imbroscio, Williamson and Alperovitz 2003; Imbrosciso 2013). This would more securely 
anchor investments in the city and it may provide a mechanism through which to counter 
gentrification. 
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Notes 
1. Page and Goldsmith (1987, 5–7) recommend a fourfold classification of local autonomy 
for use in comparative studies. In addition to the constitutional status and the degree of 
financial and fiscal autonomy, they propose an analysis of the different kinds and ranges 
of services and functions that local governments must perform and the discretion local 
governments possess in determining how they want to perform these service and 
functions. 
2. There are ten SCCs in the 34 OECD countries: Canberra, Australia; Ottawa, Canada; 
Berlin, Germany; Jerusalem, Israel; Rome, Italy, The Hague, The Netherlands; 
Wellington, New Zealand; Bern, Switzerland; Ankara, Turkey; Washington, D.C., 
United States. 
3. See Gilligan (2013, 34-35) for a discussion of other explanations of why the new capital 
city was established on the Potomac River. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Anonymized list of interview partners 
Interview 
number 
City Role Relevant affiliation(s) 
1 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Partner and lawyer 
2 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Swiss bank 
Swiss Post 
3 Bern Public official City of Bern 
4 Bern Public official 
National politician 
Mayor of a Swiss city 
5 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Local firm 
National politician  
6 Bern 
Economic development 
agent 
Canton of Bern 
7 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
International firm 
Employer Association canton of Bern 
Chamber of Commerce of the canton of 
Bern 
8 Bern Expert University of Bern,  
9 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Swiss Venture Club 
Venture capitalist 
10 Bern Public official Canton of Bern 
11 Bern Public official Municipality of Köniz 
12 
Bern Public official Federal Office for Spatial Development 
Bern Public official Federal Office for Spatial Development 
13 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
National Politician 
Ex-member, City Council of Bern 
14 Bern 
Economic development 
agent 
Economic Area of Bern (Bern 
Wirtschaftsraum) 
15 Bern 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Local firm  
16 Bern Expert Journalist and author 
17 Bern 
Economic development 
agent 
Capital Region Switzerland 
18 Bern Public official 
Mayor of a Swiss City 
National politician 
19 Bern Expert Consultant 
20 The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
21 The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Entrepreneur 
22 The Hague Expert Leiden University  
23 The Hague 
Economic development 
agent 
The Hague Security Delta 
24 The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
International firm 
25 
The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
The Hague Public official City of The Hague  
26 The Hague Expert The Hague University of Applied Sciences 
27 The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
28 
The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Lawyer and partner 
The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Lawyer and partner 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
29 The Hague Public official Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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30 The Hague 
Economic development 
agent 
West-Holland Foreign Investment Agency  
31 The Hague 
Economic development 
agent 
InnovationQuarter 
32 The Hague Expert Delft University of Technology 
33 The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
34 The Hague Expert Consultant 
35 The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Chamber of Commerce of Southwest 
Holland 
36 The Hague Expert Centre for Innovation, Leiden University 
37 The Hague Public official Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs  
38 The Hague Public official Province South Holland 
39 The Hague 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
NGO 
40 The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
41 
The Hague Expert Consultant 
The Hague Expert Consultant 
42 
The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
The Hague Public official City of The Hague 
43 
The Hague 
Economic development 
agent 
Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The 
Hague 
The Hague 
Economic development 
agent 
Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The 
Hague 
44 Ottawa Public official City of Ottawa 
45 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Developer 
46 Ottawa Expert University of Ottawa  
47 Ottawa Expert Forum of Federations 
48 Ottawa Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
49 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Ottawa Centre for Research and 
Innovation 
50 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Ottawa Chamber of Commerce 
51 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Ontario Centres of Excellence 
52 Ottawa Public official National Capital Commission 
53 Ottawa Public official Ottawa 2017 Bureau 
54 Ottawa Public official National Capital Commission 
55 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Invest Ottawa 
56 Ottawa Public official FedDev Ontario 
57 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Gatineau Chamber of Commerce 
58 Ottawa Expert University of Ottawa 
59 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Alcatel-Lucent 
Invest Ottawa 
60 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Information and Communications 
Technology Council 
61 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Kanata North Business Association 
62 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Développement économique – CLD 
Gatineau 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Ville de Gatineau 
63 
Ottawa Economic development 
agent 
Invest Ottawa 
64 
Ottawa Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Startup Grind Ottawa 
Entrepreneur 
65 Washington D.C. Public official Department of Homeland Security 
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66 Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments 
67 Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Rockville Economic Development 
68 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Developer 
2030 Business group 
69 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Federal City Council 
70 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Northern Virginia Technology Council 
71 Washington D.C. Expert George Mason University 
72 
Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Alexandria Economic Development 
Partnership, Inc. 
Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Alexandria Economic Development 
Partnership, Inc. 
73 Washington D.C. Public official District of Columbia, Office of Planning 
74 
Washington D.C. Public official National Capital Planning Commission 
Washington D.C. Public official National Capital Planning Commission 
75 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute 
76 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Venture capitalist 
77 Washington D.C. Public official Washington D.C. Mayor's Office 
78 
Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Arlington Economic Development 
Washington D.C. 
Economic development 
agent 
Arlington Economic Development 
79 Washington D.C. Expert Brookings Institutions 
80 Washington D.C. Expert Woodrow Wilson International Center 
81 Washington D.C. Expert D.C. Appleseed Center for Law & Justice 
82 Washington D.C. Expert George Washington University 
83 Washington D.C. Expert Virginia Tech 
84 Washington D.C. Public official 
U.S. Office of Community Planning and 
Development 
85 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Lawyer and Partner  
86 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Downtown D.C. Business Improvement 
District 
87 Washington D.C. 
Private actor/Interest 
group representative 
Greater Washington Board of Trade  
88 
Washington D.C. Expert George Washington University 
Washington D.C. Expert George Washington University 
89 Washington D.C. Public official 
District of Columbia Government, Office 
of Revenue Analysis 
90 Washington D.C. Public official Washington D.C. Mayor's Office 
91 Washington, D.C. Public official Congressional staffer 
 
 
